One goal of the generic group model is to provide a reasonable abstraction for certain groups, such as elliptic curve groups, for which not many properties beyond the abstractly defined properties of a group are known.
Negative implications. The main theorem allows us to provide an example of a computational problem of high cryptographic relevance which is equivalent to factoring in the generic model, but easy to solve if elements of Z N are given in their standard representation as integers. Concretely, we prove that computing the Jacobi symbol [Sho08, Chapter 12.2] of an integer modulo N in the generic ring model is equivalent to factoring N. Since there are simple and efficient non-generic algorithms which compute the Jacobi symbol [Sho08, Chapter 12.2], this provides an example of a natural computational problem which is hard in the generic ring model, but easy to solve if elements of Z N are given in their standard representation as integers. Thus, a proof in the generic ring model is unfortunately not a strong indicator for the hardness of a computational problem in the standard model.
Interpretation. For many common idealized models in cryptography it has been shown that a cryptographic reduction in the ideal model need not guarantee security in the "real world". Famous examples are the random oracle model [CGH04] , the ideal cipher model [Bla06] , and the generic group model [Fis00, Den02]. All these results have in common that they provide somewhat "artificial" computational problems that deviate from standard cryptographic practice.
Note, however, that both the definition and the algebraic properties of the Jacobi symbol are remarkably similar to the quadratic residuosity problem [GM84], which builds the foundation of numerous cryptosystems and is widely conjectured to be hard. Thus, in contrast to previous works, the equivalence of computing the Jacobi symbol generically and factoring is an example of a natural computational problem that is provably hard in the generic model, but easy to solve if elements of Z N are given in their standard representation as integers modulo N. This is an important aspect for interpreting results in the generic ring model, like [Bro05, LR06, AM09, AMS11]. Thus, a proof in the generic model is unfortunately not a strong indicator that the considered problem is indeed useful for cryptographic applications.
Positive implications. Despite this negative result, generic hardness results still provide a lower complexity bound for a large class of algorithms, namely all algorithms solving a problem independent of a given representation of ring elements. Motivated by this fact, we show as another application of our main theorem that solving the well-known quadratic residuosity problem [GM84] generically is equivalent to factoring. Thus, from a cryptanalytic point of view, we cannot hope to find an algorithm solving this problem efficiently without exploiting any property of the representation of ring elements, unless factoring integers is easy.
